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POINT PAPER

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ASAT FUNDING AND TEST MORATORIUM


Potential Congressional actions will jeopardize the restructured program contained in the PB and supported by OSD in recent Program Decision Memorandums.

The House Authorization Bill cuts FY87 request of \$278M to \$140M--no Production Verification (PV), no intercept testing.

- Without PV, much of design will remain in R&D configuration--lacks many operability, supportability, producibility factors.
- Opponents of testing belittle Soviet coorbital ASAT and other potential systems and ignore Soviet low-altitude satellite targeting/recce capabilities.
 - Soviet coorbital ASAT still a formidable threat against our low orbiting satellites.
 - Soviet low-altitude satellites are capable of providing recce and targeting data against US/Allied ground and sea forces.
 - Soviet satellites and ASAT have integral roles in their overall force employment doctrine at many levels of conflict.
 - F-15 ASAT provides an important, non-nuclear option, in the escalation control ladder.
 - Intercept testing is necessary for credible development of Air-Launched ASAT.
- House language also encourages development of alternative systems, both passive and active, without providing additional funding.
 - Alternative systems cannot be deployed as quickly and would involve more fiscal/technical risk. Will be examined as part of follow-on ASAT decisions.

Senate Authorization Bill cuts FY87 request from \$278M to \$216M, no test restrictions.

- Cut will impact PV, possibly delay production start.



- Without an ASAT, we concede to Soviets an unrestricted space sanctuary and wartime control of space--destabilizing.
 - No contribution to arms control.
 - Soviets able to target US/Allied forces.
 - Soviet escalation to space warfare more likely in conventional war.
- In the event of conflict, this imbalance could manifest itself in the form of lost US and Allied lives and hinder achievement of national objectives.
- There is also Congressional concern that program is poorly planned/executed--based on past schedule slips, cost increases. Congress should understand that the PB program provides a clear and achievable path to our much needed initial ASAT capability.
 - No major technical issues remain.
 - PV will provide producible, operationally viable design--reduced O&M costs, faster mission response times.
 - Program will provide sufficient quantity of missiles to negate the most critical, near-term threat satellites--those capable of rapidly providing targeting data against US/Allied forces.

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DCS Approved

Capt Dillman/XPOD/3939/vaj/10 Sep 86